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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a custody matter in which the magistrate court ordered Father 
to pay for all of the services of the Parenting Coordinator even though the Parenting 
Coordinator took part in actions that: 
(1) violated Idaho Code Section 32-717D; 
(2) violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(1); 
(3) were specifically prohibited for any Parenting Coordinator to perform under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(1)(7)(D); 
(4) were outside the scope of the order of appointment and any existing order (the 
Parenting Coordinator was not given any powers under any order); and 
(5) violated the "Parenting Coordinator's oath" (to follow Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16(1)) that must be signed by each Parenting Coordinator when 
applying to the Supreme Court. 
BACKGROUNDIFACTS 
For purposes of this brief, the Appellant, Frank William Hausladen, Jr., shall be 
referred to as "Father", Shari Knoche shall be referred to as "Mother" and the Parenting 
Coordinator, John Sahlin, shall be referred to as the "Parenting Coordinator". 
An Order Modifying Custody was signed and entered on or about February 2, 
2005.' In said order, John Sahlin, Attorney at Law, was appointed to act as the Parenting 
Coordinator. The order set forth that the parties shall split the fee of the Parenting 
Coordinator equally. The order was silent as to the powers of the Parenting Coordinator 
' Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 63. 
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and procedures2 required by I.R.C.P. 16(1). To date, no order has been entered by the 
magistrate court that modifies the language in the order dated February 2, 2005, as it 
applies to the Parenting Coordinator. 
In late May, 2005, the Parenting Coordinator was contacted by Mother andlor 
Mother's attorney in order to determine "the start of summer" and to "approve" the 
summer visitation schedule proposed by   other.^ At some point, the Parenting 
Coordinator requested the date the minor child's school would start in August. Father 
provided said information to Mother and the Parenting Coordinator in the form of a letter. 
After discussing the issue with Mother and Father, the Parenting Coordinator issued a 
letter dated June 3,2005, in which he "determined" when summer began for purposes of 
the custody schedule and "approved" the Mother's proposed summer ~chedule.~ The 
Parenting Coordinator's conduct and language in his correspondence indicated that he 
was empowered to perform the duties he was exercising. The appearance of the 
Parenting Coordinator's "empowerment" continued through his subsequent conduct and 
representations. 
In the early summer of 2005, Mother and/or Mother's attorney contacted the 
Parenting Coordinator in order to have the Parenting Coordinator decide whether an 
outstanding judgment (in favor of Father) relating to attorney fees in an order to show 
cause motion had been paid by Mother. The Parenting Coordinator discussed this matter 
with both Mother and Father. The Parenting Coordinator issued several letters setting 
forth his opinion (but not a recommendation or determination) on the matter in July, 
2005.~ Mother "invited" the Parenting Coordinator to address several other issues in 
July, 2005.~ 
In mid-August, 2005, Mother contacted the Parenting Coordinator to determine 
the date when thesummer visitation schedule ended and normal visitation resumed. 
Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 64. 
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
Exhibits 10 and l l to  Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
Exhibit 11 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
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Mother scheduled "summer" parenting time to overlap into the school year.7 After 
discussing the matter with both parties, the Parenting Coordinator made a decision and 
advised Father of the decision orally. The parties abided by the oral decision of the 
Parenting Coordinator. 
On or about August 8, 2005, Father had is first and only conference with the 
Parenting ~oordinator.~ The Parenting Coordinator did not describe (orally or in writing) 
the role of the Parenting Coordinator. Father and the Parenting Coordinator mostly 
discussed the "history"/ background of the case. 
In September, 2005, Mother andlor Mother's attorney discussed various matters 
with the Parenting Coordinator including but not limited to the outstanding judgment 
discussed above, make-up time for parenting time lost when the Parenting Coordinator 
"approved" Mother's defective summer schedule after knowing when school started,' 
which parent could choose the minor child's school, and whether Father could be forced 
to allow the six (6) year old minor child to possess a cell phone provided by Mother. 
Even though the Parenting Coordinator knew or should have known that he had no 
powers to act, he continued to "investigate" these matters presented by Mother. 
The Parenting Coordinator met with Mother and her spouse for one and one-half 
(1 %) hours on September 28,2005. On September 29, 20051°, the Parenting Coordinator 
filed his first "Order/Recommendation" which deemed a judgment to be "paid in full and 
satisfied" and awarded Mother a week of "make-up" parenting time to commence in less 
than two (2) weeks from the time the "Order/Recommendationn was filed. 
The Parenting Coordinator had not contacted Father regarding any issue since 
late August, 2005." Although the Parenting Coordinator spent at least one and one half 
(1 %) hours with Mother and her spouse the day before issuing the 
' Although Father provided the Parenting Coordinator and Mother with the proposed start date for school, 
the Parenting Coordinator "approved" Mother's proposed schedule - see Exhibit 10 to Appellant's 
StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
'Exhibit 9 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
'O Although the "OrderiRecommendation" was dated by the Parenting Coordinator as "Nov 29" and 
completed the certiftcate of service for "Nov 29". 
" Exhibit 9 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
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"Order/Recommendation", the Parenting Coordinator did not even try to contact Father 
for any input prior to issuing the "Order/Recommendation" 
The September 29,2005, "Order/Recommendation" states: 
The undersigned Parenting Coordinator, having corresponded with 
the parties and having read the court file with regard to the issues 
discussed herein, and having found the following resolutions to be in 
the best interests of the parties' minor child, hereby 
orders/recommends as follows: 
1. The Judgement entered September 9, 2004, and modified by the 
Order entered November 15, 2004, is deemed paid in full and 
satisfied. Petitioner has made various monetary claims against 
Respondent outside the scope of any issues presented herefore 
before the court, and not necessarily related to any issues 
pertinent to this case, and is therefore privileged to present those 
claims in another forum or at another time for adjudication. 
2. Respondent was entitled to seven (7) weeks of summer visitation 
by virtue of the Order Modifying Custody entered on or about 
November 29, 2004. Due at  least in part to an oversight of the 
undersigned Parenting Coordinator, Respondent had only six (6) 
summer visitation. In an attempt to compensate 
or this missed time with his mother, the undersigned has 
determined that Respondent should be allowed on (1) extra 
"weekend" (as that term is defined in the aforementioned Order 
Modifying Custody), which will occur from October 12 through 
October 16,2005. 
3. Both oarties have alluded to various oronouncements the court . 
has made during proceedings in this matter somehow modifying 
the court's clear determination in the aforementioned Order 
Modifying Custody that the parties share joint legal custody of 
The undersigned has found no indication in the court 
files herein that the court has entered any order modifying the 
order for joint legal custody, and therefore will continue to assume 
that determination is the law of the case." (emphasis added) 
Upon receipt of the Parenting Coordinator's "Order/Recommendation", 
Petitioner-Appellant immediately contacted the Parenting Coordinator via telephone and 
objected, requesting that the Parenting Coordinator rescind the 
'' Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 76. 
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misrepresentations of fact relating to a "stipulated" agreement among the parties that was 
never stipulated to. 
Father filed an amended objectioniappeal to the Parenting Coordinator's 
"Orders/Recomrnendations" to correct the misrepresentation of fact contained in the 
revised "OrderlRecommendation" and renewed the objections previously filed. The basis 
for Fathers objections were as follows: 
(1) the Parenting Coordinator was not appointed pursuant to the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 16(1); 
(2) the Parenting Coordinator's OrderlRecommendation is beyond 
the specific powers of a Parenting Coordinator set forth in the Court's 
Order dated February 1,2005; 
(3) the Parenting Coordinator's OrderlRecommendation is beyond 
the specific powers of a Parenting Coordinator defined in I.R.C.P. 
16(l); the Parenting Coordinator did not provide proper notice to 
Petitioner andlor allow Petitioner 'an opportunity to be heard' piror 
to issuing the OrderlRecommendation: - 
(4) the Parenting Coordinator's amendment to the original 
OrderlRecommendation, contains misstatements of fact, such as: 
a. The statement 'having corresponded with the parties with 
regard to the issues discussed herein' infers that the parties sent 
letters or some other written correspondence when in fact all 
communications of Petitioner where over the telephone (with the 
exception of the Objections filed with the Court and faxed to the 
Parenting Coordinator). 
b. The statement 'Based on the agreement of the parties.. .' at 
the beginning of the paragraph is a misstatement of fact. Petitioner 
was and is only in agreement to the revocation of the prior order. 
Petitioner specifically informed the Parenting Coordinator that 
Petitioner would object to 'make up time' if the Parenting 
Coordinator merely 'rescheduled' the 'make up time' set forth in the 
original recommendation. 
c. The statement 'The parties have agreed that the make-up 
time. . .' in the middle of paragraph 2 is a misstatement of fact. 
Petitioner agreed only that the Parenting Coordinator revoke the 
'make-up time' set forth in October to allow Petitioner time to appeal 
the Parenting Coordinator's recommendations. 
d. The Parenting Coordinator's analysislfiudings are 
inconsistent with the facts of the case and are not 'in the best interest 
of the cl~ild'.'~ 
14 Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Statement/Affidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
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The issues related to Father's objections to the Parenting Coordinator's 
"Orders/Recomendations" were heard by the magistrate court on December 7, 2005. 
At the hearing, the Parenting Coordinator took part in legal argument against Father's 
objections/appeal to the Parenting Coordinator's ~rder/Recommendation.'~ The 
magistrate court allowed the legal argument kom the Parenting Coordinator even though 
Father objected.I6 At the hearing, the Parenting Coordinator admitted that he lacked 
powers to act. The Parenting Coordinator requested the court to enter a new order which 
would set forth the powers of the Parenting ~oordiantor.'" The court did not rule on 
whether the Parenting Coordinator committed any ultra vires acts. 
On December 12, 2005, Father filed a "PetitiodMotion Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
16(1)(9)(B)" in order to terminate the Parenting Coordinator's appointment for cause.'* 
Father's petition requested the court to make a specific factual finding of the actions of 
the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator and a legal ruling that the Parenting 
Coordinator exceeded his mandate, acted in a manner inconsistent with 1R.C.P. 16(1) and 
demonstrated bias, all of which are grounds for removal under I.R.C.P. 16(1). In the 
alternative, Father requested that the court reconsider the requests made at the December 
7,2005, hearing and make a specific finding of fact and a legal ruling on the objections to 
the Parenting Coordinator's "Orders/Recommendations" heard by the court on December 
7,2005. 
At the hearing on December 30, 2005, the trial court "dissolved" the Parenting 
Coordinator's appointment since the appointment became another source of dispute 
rather than helping the paxties comm~nicate.'~ l t h o u ~ h  the court acknowledged that the 
Parenting Coordinator's order of appointment is "very cursory and doesn't really outline 
uh, specific authorities, powers, duties, responsibilities and so onmz0 the court refused to 
IS Pages 6 - 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
l6 Pages 6 - 7 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
l7 Pages 20 - 25 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 80. 
I9 Page 56, lines 12 - 21 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Angmentation of Appellate Record. 
'' Page 55, line 25, page 56, lines 1 - 2 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of 
Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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make a finding that the Parenting Coordinator abused his authorities or his powers.2' At 
the end of the hearing, Father reminded the court that his petition specifically asked for a 
legal and factual finding of the Parenting Coordinator's actions.22 The court again 
refused to make a finding that the Parenting Coordinator exceeded the lawful authority of 
any orders.23 
The court instructed Father to prepare an order reflecting the court's ruling. 
Father prepared an order that accurately reflected the court's ruling.24 The proposed 
order set forth a specific account of the evidence taken into consideration by the court at 
the time of and a legal conclusion based on the court's decision at the hearing. 
Prior to signing the order, the court "struck" the title of the order, the evidence 
considered, the argument considered and the holding discussed at the hearing.26 
Although the court ruled at the time of hearing that the Parenting Coordinator did not 
exceed his mandate, the co~ut  refused to sign an order that stated: the Parenting 
Coordinator "has (emphasis added) acted outside the powers enumerated in the order 
dated February 1,2005, nor has he violated I.R.C.P. 16(1). . ."27 
After receiving the Order (Hearing on 12-30-05) as modified by the court, Father 
timely filed a motion for reconsideration relating to the Petition filed by Father to remove 
the Parenting Coordinator for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(1)(9)(~) .~~ Father's motion 
for reconsideration stated that the order signed by the court failed to rule upon the 
petition in question and he requested an order on the merits of the petition, particularly, a 
factual finding based on the record andor the Court's file on the case and a legal ruling 
" Page 56, lines 5 - 6 and 11 - 12 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
22 Page 61, limes 1 - 12 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
23 Page 61, lines 13 - 15, line 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
24 Pages 38 - 61 of E'uhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
25 Pages 38 - 61 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. - compare with "struck out" language in the order (of Exhibit 4 to Appellant's 
StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.). 
26 Exhibit 4 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
Exhibit 4 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record.. 
" Exhibit 5 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
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on the elements set forth in the petition.29 At a hearing held on March 1, 2006, Father's 
motion for reconsideration was denied. 
All in all, after multiple timely requests and at least three (3) hearings, the coud 
refused to make a ruling in a written order that the Parenting Coordinator violated an 
order, rule or statute AND refused to set forth in a written order that the Parenting 
Coordinator DID NOT violate an order, rule or statute. 
On May 17, 2006, the Parenting Coordinator filed a "Motion for Order to Show 
Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of Hearingn3' which was accompanied by 
"Affidavit of John H. Sahlin re: Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of 
~udgment."~' The motion requested the court to issue an "Order to Show Cause why 
Petitioner herein should not he held in contempt for failure to pay fees of the undersigned 
. . . and further moves this court for Entry of Judgment against him  a at her]."^' At the 
time of hearing, Father set forth objections relating to the Parenting Coordinator's 
"Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of d ear in^".^^ 
Instead of sustaining or overruling the objections, the court unilaterally transformed the 
Parenting Coordinator's "Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment 
and Notice of Hearing" into a "Motion to Determine Costs." 
The court failed to rule on Father's procedural objections and simply continued 
with the court's own "Motion to Determine Costs". Although Father timely objected to 
the court's actions, the court simply ignored Father, neither sustained or overruled the 
objections, and proceeded with the "Motion to Determine Fees". The court ruled in the 
Parenting Coordinator's favor and awarded all fees "charged" by the Parenting 
Coordinator hut did not allow any prejudgment interest. 
29 Exhibit 5 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
'O Exhibit 7 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
31 Exhibit 8 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
32 Exhibit 7 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate 
Record. 
" Including but not limited to: the motion and supporting documentation was not in compliance witb the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Idaho law, the motion was procedurally flawed as no order to show 
cause bad been issued, and the moving party had no standing to file an order to show cause. 
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The Honorable Charles Hosack, District Judge heard the first appeal and affirmed 
the magistrate court's decision. In his holding, Judge Hosack stated something to the 
effect of: "I don't think the appellate courts would look kindly on me holding that a 
Parenting Coordinator committed ultra vires acts." 
On February 26, 2007, Magistrate Judge B a y  Watson, entered an "Order of 
Voluntary Disqualification". The basis for Judge Watson withdrawing from the case 
was: "[ilt appearing to the court that the ends of justice would best be served by another 
judge handling the [case]. . ." 
Appellant's Brief 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1)  The court-appointed Parent Coordinator took part in actions in violation of: 
a. Idaho Code Section 32-717D; 
i. Idaho Code Section 32-717D requires any and all powers of the 
Parenting Coordinator to be set forth in an order. 
ii. Idaho Code Section 32-717D does not allow a Parenting 
Coordinator to have any powers "by default". 
iii. The language of Idaho Code Section 32-717D is unambiguous and 
can not be construed to "infer" a Parenting Coordinator's powers 
"by default." 
b. the court's order of appointment (including any subsequent order relating 
to the Parenting Coordinator); 
c. I.R.C.P. 16(1); and/or; 
i. Requires any and all powers of the Parenting Coordinator to be set 
forth in an order. 
ii. Does not allow a Parenting Coordinator to have any powers "by 
default". 
d. the "Parenting Coordinator's oath" as set forth in the Idaho Supreme 
Court's "Application for Registration as a Parenting Coordinator Affidavit 
of ~ o m ~ l i a n c e " ~  
34 "I have read and understand the contents of 1.R.C.P 16(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to 
parenting coordinators in child custody and visitation disputes, and I will provide this service to which I am 
appointed in conformance therewith." 
Appellant's Brief 14 
(2) The court-appointed Parenting Coordinator who takes part in actions that violate 
the cow's order, I.R.C.P. 16(1), Idaho Code Section 32-717D andlor the 
"Parenting Coordinator's oath" is not entitled to payment for his services. 
(3) At the hearing on June 5, 2006, the magistrate court committed a reversible error 
and/or abused its discretion when it: 
a. Did not uphold Petitioner's objections to the motion for order to show 
cause filed by the court-appointed former Parenting Coordinator. 
b. Did not disqualify itself from hearing the court-appointed former 
Parenting Coordinator's motion for order to show cause (motion brought 
by court and denied). 
c. Unilaterally changed the former Parenting Coordinator's Motion for Order 
to Show Cause into a "Motion to Determine Fees." 
d. Refused to consider that the acts of the Parenting Coordinator violated the 
court's order, Idaho Code Section 32-717D and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1). 
e. Issued a judgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator under an 
equitable remedy when an equitable remedy is not appropriate and the 
Parenting Coordinator did not have "clean hands". 
f. Issued a judgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator for actions that 
were contrary to public policy. 
Appellant's Brief 
ISSUE (l)(a): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of 
Idaho Code Section 32-717D 
I.C. Section 32-717D(1) requires: 
". . . the court may order the appointment of a parenting coordinator 
to perform such duties as authorized by the court, consistent with any 
controlling judgment or order of a court relating to the child or 
children of the parties, and as set forth within the order of 
a ~ p o i n t m e n t . ~ ~  (emphasis added). 
LC. Section 32-717D clearly requires that an order from the court set forth any 
and all powers of the parenting coordinator. If the order fails to set forth the powers of 
the parenting coordinator, the parenting coordinator has no powers. The Idaho code sets 
forth no "powers by default" that automatically vest in a parenting coordinator if the 
order of appointment is lacking. 
In a recent "family law" decision, the Idaho Supreme Court investigated how the 
meaning of a statute is to be determined: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. (cite omitted) The Court must give every 
word, clause and sentence effect, if possible. (cite omitted) This Court 
must also construe a statute to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. (cite omitted) The legislature's intent is ascertained from 
the statutory language and the Court may seek edification from the 
statute's legislative history and historical content at enactment. (cite 
omitted) In construing a statute, the Supreme Court may examine the 
language used, reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and 
the policy behind the statutes. Webb v. Webb, 2006 Opinion No. 106 
pages 4-5 (1 1129106). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also examined this issue in MATTER OF PERMIT 
NO. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,822-823 (1992): 
3i LC. Section 32-717D(l). 
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I t  is a basic rule of statutory construction that, unless the result is 
palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is 
clearly stated in the statute. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 
805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 
(1986); State Dep't of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 
Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299 (1979). I t  is also well established that statutes 
must be interpreted to mean what the legislature intended the statute 
to mean, Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 
(1991); Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Carpenter v. 
Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575,691 P.2d 1190 (1984), and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254, 
805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 
111 (1983); Shenvood & Roberts Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650 
P.2d 677 (1982). Statutory interpretation always begins with an 
examination of the literal words of the statute. Local 1494 of the Int'l 
Ass'n of Firefighters v. Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 
1346 (1978). In so doing, every word, clause and sentence should be 
given effect, if possible. Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 
(1986); Universitv of Utah Hosp. & Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 
245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980). The clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for 
construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous. 
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); 
Ottesen ex rel. Edwards v. Board of Comr's of Madison County, 107 Idaho 
1099, 695 P.2d 1238 (1985). Finally, when construing a statute, its 
words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning. 
Shenvood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); 
Walker v. Henslev Trucking, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1187 (1984). 
The Supreme Court further reasoned that a litigant cannot invent or "makeup" an 
ambiguity that is not present - conmon sense prevails: 
However, ambiguity is not established merely because different 
possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case 
then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered 
ambiguous. As the district court stated: 
. . . a statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute 
mind can devise more than one interpretation of it. 
The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be 
preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the 
exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and 
powerful intellect would discover. 
Appellant's Brief 
[The] Rule of coustructiou to consider object and purpose has no 
place when words of [the] act leave no doubt. John Hancoclc Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 192, 191 P.2d 359 (1948) .~~  
"Finally, when construing a statute, its words must be given their plain, usual and 
ordinary meaning." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254,805 P.2d 452,460 (1991). 
The testimony of the Parenting Coordinator at the June 5, 2006, hearing appears37 
to suggest that he is automatically vested with certain powers38 under I.C. Section 32- 
717D and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1) or he had no powers and the powers exercised by him were 
anthorized by the parties.39 In the case at hand, I.C. Section 32-717D is unambiguous 
and requires that the order of appointment (or some order from the trial court) MUST 
stateiset forth the powers of the Parenting Coordinator. If the court has not set forth the 
powersiduties of the Parenting Coordinator, the Parenting Coordinator has no 
powersldnties. The "plain, usual and ordinary meaningw4' of LC. Section 32-717D 
requires the granting of any powersiduties to a court-appointed Parenting Coordinator to 
be in the form of a duly exercised written order from the trial courtlpresiding court. 
Therefore, any exercise of a power by a Parenting Coordinator that is not 
specifically set forth in a court order is a violation of Idaho Code Section 32-7171). Since 
the Parenting Coordinator had no powers to act, the Parenting Coordinator's actions were 
ultra vires. If the Parenting Coordinator has not power to act, he is not entitled for 
" MATTER OF PERMIT NO. 36-7200 at 823. 
" It is difficult to determine with 100% certainty since the Parenting Coordinator's testimony is comprised 
mostly of "I don't recall" and his "answers" to questions under oath are inconsistent andor fail to answer 
the question asked (are evasive). 
38 At several points in his testimony under oath at the June 5, 2006, hearing, the Parenting Coordinator's 
attempts to "argue" that he was exercising powers inferred by 1.R.C.P 16(1) and I.C. Section 32-7171). 
However, as the transcript shows, the Parenting Coordinator never explains his reasoning for this 
contention and purposely avoids any specifics in his "explaination." 
j 9  "Q. I believe we had a phone conversation and it was your opinion that by our actions we authorized you 
to do all these actions in this case even though the order didn't specify any powers, is that correct? 
A. That's correct." Page 109, lines 5 - 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of 
Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.. 
40 Shewood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254 (1991). 
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renumeration for the ultra vires act as the Parenting Coordinator affirms during his sworn 
testimony on June 5,2006: 
A. I don't recall specifically the sequence of 
events, but I can tell you that without an order of 
appointment I can't do anything in a case. If I don't 
have the authority, I have no reason to act much less 
send out a billing.41 
ISSUE (l)(b): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of The 
Court's Order of Appointment 
The order that appointed the parenting coordinator fails to set forth any powers or 
procedures for the parenting coordinator: 
5. The Court further determines that it would be 
in the best interest of hat a parenting 
coordinator be appointed in this particular matter. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 32-717(d)~', all expenses 
associated with the parenting coordinator shall be split 
equally. Pursuant to agreement, the Court hereby 
appoints John Sahlin as the parenting coordinator in 
this particular matter.43 
No subsequent orders of the Court define or set forth the powers of the Parenting 
Coordinator. Therefore, the Parenting Coordinator, was appointed to a position by the 
trial court but was not "empowered" with any duties. Most importantly, he admitted that 
he had no powers from the 
4' Page 95, lines 5 - 9 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
42 The reference to I.C. Section 32-717(d) in the order of appointment above is most likely a typographical 
error by Richard Kochansky (attorney for the Defendant, Shari Knoche) which was not corrected by Judge 
Watson prior to signing the order. I.C. Section 32-717D, not 32-717(d), relates to the Parenting 
Coordinator. 
43 Clerk's Record Supreme Court No. 32610, Page 63. 
Page 8, lines 6 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record, which is quoted in the following paragraph and "All the order says, 
your Honor, is that I was appointed Parenting Coordinator and the costs are split 50150." Page 5, lines 22 - 
24. 
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Although the testimony of at his Order to Show Cause hearing on June 5, 2006, 
was most ofien "I don't recall" to most issues, his memory appeared to be very good at a 
hearing on December 7, 2005, about the same issues. In fact, the Parent Coordinator 
stated: 
. . . under my order of appointment there's no authority granted to 
me, it just says John Sahlin is the parenting coordinator and the costs 
split 50150. So I really don't have authority, specific authority, either 
under the rule or under the order of appointment to make any - - even 
a recommendation about4' the satisfaction of this judgment. 
So then the question becomes did the parties either tacitly or 
explicitly give me the authority to make that decision? And whether 
they did or didn't, if I'm not given the authority, can I even make that 
decision anyway? And that's a purely legal argument so it doesn't 
require my testimony.46 
All the order says, your Honor, is that I was appointed Parenting 
Coordinator and the costs are split 50150.~~ 
The Parent Coordinator, based on the representations at the December 7, 2007, 
hearing, including those cited above, represented to the Court that he no actuaVspecific 
powers as Parenting ~oordinator.~' This conclusion is further "backed up" by the Parent 
Coordinator's requests that the Court issue an order: ". . . specifically outlining the scope 
of my duties . . .'49; ". . . if I have the scope and ability to deal with. . ."50; ". . .If the 
45 The Transcript contained a typographical error and "without" was corrected to "about" pursuant to Judge 
Watson's order to correct the transcript (corrected by order - see Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case 
No. 34728, Page 24). 
46 Page 8, lines 6 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record.. 
" Page 5, lines 22 - 24 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffdavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
48 Other than powers that may have been conferred upon him by Father andlor Mother which is inferred 
from his questiodstatement on page 8, lines 14 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in 
Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
49 Page 20, lines 22 - 23 of Exhibit I to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
Page 21, lines 4 - 5 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemnentiAfiidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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Court would give me more direction, more authority, more specific authority. . ."5' and 
the discussion relating to the drafiing of an order setting forth the powers ofthe Parenting 
Coordinator between the Court, the Parenting Coordinator, Mr. Kochansky and  ath her.^^ 
As stated elsewhere herein, without authority under an order, the Parenting 
Coordinator is empowered to do nothing and likewise, cannot collect on ultra vires 
services performed. 
ISSUE (l)(c): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of 
I.R.C.P. 16(1) 
Idaho Code Section 32-717D(2) states: "Qualification,. selection, appointment, 
termination of appointment and prescribed duties and responsibilities of a parenting 
coordinator shall be based upon standards and criteria adopted by the Idaho supreme 
court." The legislative intentipurpose was to allow the Idaho Supreme Court to further 
establish qualifications for the parenting coordinators. 53 I.R.C.P. 16(1) is the rule adopted 
by the Supreme Court relating to Parenting Coordinators. 
The wording of I.R.C.P. 16(1) mirrors I.C. Section 32-717D(1) requiring that the 
order of appointment set forth the dutiesipowers of the Parenting ~oord ina to r~~ .  
51 Page 21, lines 22 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Statement/Affi&avil in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
52 Pages 22 - 30 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
53 "This bill establishes consistency and criteria for parenting coordinators in divorce cases in the State of 
Idaho. It also gives authority to the Idaho Supreme Court to further establish qualifications for the parenting 
coordinators. Parenting coordinators will act to assist parents in developing parenting skills, and to assist 
them in collaborative dispute resolution for the best interest of the children." Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 
108 of 122, House Bill No. 541. 
'' For example, I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(B) states: "By way of illustration and not limitation the order 9 
authorize the Parenting Coordinator to determine such matters as: . . ." (emphasis added); I.R.C.P. 
16(1)(5)(C) states: "By way of illustration and not limitation the order may authorize the Parenting 
Coordinator to make recommendations to the court on such matters as: . . ." 
Appellant's Brief 2 1 
I.R.C.P. 16(1)(8)(A) also requires5' the procedure to be followed by the Parenting 
Coordinator to be included in the order. Obviously, this essential element is also missing 
from the order of appointment authored by Mr. Kochansky and signed by Judge 
 ats son.^^ In the absence of an order from the presiding court that meets the 
requirements of LC. Section 32-7171) andlor I.R.C.P. 16(1), the only entity that has 
authority to make decisions regarding the case at hand is the trial court. In other words, 
the "plain, usual and ordinary meaning"57 of I.C. Section 32-717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1) 
require any and all powers of the Parenting Coordinator to be set forth in an order from 
the court. 
I.R.C.P. 16(1) allows for a Parenting Coordinator to determine58 "any other issues 
submitted for immediate determination by agreement of the parties."59 However, the 
introductory language of 1.R.C.P 16(1)(5)(B) states: "By way of illustration and not 
limitation the ovder mav authorize the Parenting Coordinator to determine such matters 
as: . . ." (emphasis added). When reading the rule as it is intended, the Parenting 
Coordinator can rule on "other issues submitted for immediate determination by 
agreement of the parties"60 i f  that power is set forth in the Court's order. This power is 
not provided for in any order, therefore, the Parenting Coordinator's actions based on this 
theory are ultra virus. 
" The order appointing the Parenting Coordinator shall specify the procedure. . . (emphasis added) 
56 Judge Watson, in his ruling on this matter, agrees that the order has "shortcomings" - see pages 156 line 
17 - Page 157 line 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record.. 
'" Shemood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254 (1991). 
58 Based on the wording of the rule, "determine" (when coupled with subsection @)(A) or 16(1)) appears to 
mean in a sense, "order" the parties to do something and said "order" becomes effective when 
commnnicated to the parties. 
59 I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(C)(ix.). 
60 I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(C)(ix.). 
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In addition, the illustrated powers that a Parenting Coordinator mav be granted 
under an order pursuant to 1.R.C.P 16(1)(5)(B) appear to be on issues requiring urgency 
and a quick and/or concise "ruling" since "determinations" by the Parenting Coordinator 
under this subsection become "effective when communicated to the parties."61 The 
Parenting Coordinator filed two (2) written "Orders/Recommendations" which, under the 
wording of the rule, would have to be within the purview of LR.C.P 16(1)(5)(C): a 
"recommendation" which would become "effective" fourteen (14) days after submission 
to the court (under I.R.C.P.l6(l)(S)(A)). The Parenting Coordinator is mixing different 
components of l.R.C.P 16(1) in order to "backup" his excuse for exercising powers which 
he never had. No matter how you slice it, the Parenting Coordinator had no powers to 
act. The Parenting Coordinator cannot now say that it is a simple misinterpretation of the 
rule and or statute at issue - he had the opportunity to explain his "view/theory" when he 
was under oath at the June 5,2006 hearing. purposefully evaded questions that asked for 
his explanation in this area. In addition, the Parenting Coordinator stated that he either 
helped or assisted in writing 1.R.C.P 16(1)" which would mean he should be held at a 
higher standard than other Parent Coordinators. 
Even though 1.R.C.P 16(1) requires that a Parenting Coordinator has to be 
"empowered" with the authority in a court's order to determine ". . .other issues 
submitted for immediate determination by agreement of the parties."63 (emphasis 
added) The Parent Coordinator appears to claim that he received "permission"64 from the 
6' I.R.C.P. 16(1)(8)(A). 
62 Page 117, line 15 and Page 5, lines 15 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementJAffidavit in Support of 
~ o t k n  for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(B)(ix.). 
64 The Parenting Coordinator contents that the parties agreed to have him settle the disputesiissues that he 
ruled upon. At the hearing on June 5, 2006, he appeared to purposely evade specifics regarding this 
"permission." When asked if he had anything in writing to evidence said agreement(s) he fmally agreed 
Appellant's Brief 23 
parties to rule on certain issues. The plain meaning of the rule also requires "agreement of 
the parties" (both Father and Mother) which was not proven at the hearing on this matter. 
In addition, it cannot be proven because the Parenting Coordinator was not "empowered" 
to issue Orders/Recommendations outside the authority granted by the court. The Parent 
Coordinator had no proofievidence (even though he had what appeared to be his "file" for 
this case with him while he testified) of any kind65 to show any "agreement" by the 
parties to have the Parent Coordinator rule on an issue that he did not already have the 
power to (or "appeared to" have the power to) do so. The Parent Coordinator failed to 
disclose his "lack of authority" and acted as if he was "empowered" to perform all of the 
acts that he did in this case. 
Even though the following is moot since 1.R.C.P 16(1) requires a court order to 
specify that the Parenting Coordinator can solve issues agreed by the parties, it will 
demonstrate just how ridiculous the Parent Coordinator's story is that he was empowered 
by agreement of the parties: Another component of having an "agreement" is an 
understanding by Father and Mother (the parties involved here) that the Parenting 
Coordinator is not already empowered to take the actions that he is. Parties in this 
situation can not "tacitly"66 agree to expand a Parenting Coordinator's powers. Parties 
can only "expressly"67 agree under these circumstances if the Parenting Coordinator 
clearly discloses that he is not empowered to perform the action in question is only 
doing so because both parties have agreed to allow the Parenting Coordinator to have 
that he did not have anything in writing authorizing him to act outside the scope of his authority (Page 124, 
lines 23 - 25 of Exhibit 1 ta Appellant's StatementiAftidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record.). 
Letters, emails, notes, agreements or anythmg that 
66 Page 8, line 15 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
67 Page 8, line 15 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
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additional powers. The Parent Coordinator did not prove this at the Order to Show 
Cause hearing and cannot prove this (since it did not occur). The Parent Coordinator 
merely and exercised powers as if he lawfully possessed said powers. In essence, 
the Parent Coordinator was committing fraud under the guise of a court-appointed official 
and is arguing that he should be paid for time spent on the case since Petitioner did not 
discover the fraud in time. In other words, the Parent Coordinator's theory is that he is 
entitled to payment for services up to the point where the fraud is discovered. The Parent 
Coordinator's "theory" simply makes no sense in law or equity. 
Whatever the excuse may be for leaving this vital information out of the order,@ 
if the Parent Coordinator would have reviewed the order of appointment prior to 
exercising powers in this case, he would have known that he had no powers. If the Parent 
Coordinator would have disclosed this problem, the solution would have been simple: 
draft an order, have the parties stipulate to said order and have the presiding judge sign 
the order. Instead, it appears that the Parent Coordinator took actions before getting a 
copy of the failed to disclose this vital detail Father and continued to "rule" on 
issues as if he was legally empowered to do so. The Parent Coordinator provided no 
evidence to the contrary at the hearing even though he was asked numerous questions 
asking specifics about why he believed he had any powers to act. 
" Richard Kochansky, the author of the order andlor Judge Watson for signing the order. 
69 Based on the Parenting Coordinator's telephone conversations with Petitioner and the Parenting 
Coordinator's evasive answering techniques at the June 5, 2006, hearing - see Page 93 lines 22 - 25, Page 
94 - 95, lines 1 - 9 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation 
of Appellate Record. NOTE: THE PARENTING COORDINATOR HAS NO DOUBT THAT HE 
RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ORDER BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION IN THE CASE, BUT HAS 
REALLY NO RECOLLECTION OF ANY OTHER FACTS ON THAT ISSUE. 
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The problem may be that did not even bother to review the court order until late 
August, 2005~', several months after he started exercising powers in this case. In fact, 
after the Parent Coordinator knew or should have known that he lacked any powers as the 
parenting coordinator, he attempted acts which were outside the scope of any parenting 
coordinator's powers.7' I.R.C.P. 16(1)(7)(D) states: "[tlhe Parenting Coordinator may 
not malce any modification to any order, judgment or decree; however ihe Parenting 
Coordinator may allow the parties to make minor temporary departures from a parenting 
plan if authorized by the court to do so. . ." The orderirecommendation of the Parenting 
Coordinator dated November 29, 2005, (should be September 29, 2005) deemed an 
outstanding judgment against Mother to be paid which is clearly in vioiation of I.R.C.P. 
16(1)(7)(D). In addition, the order/recommendation of the Parenting Coordinator took 
five (5) days of parenting time from the Petitioner which is clearly in violation of 1.R.C.P 
16(l) since the Parenting Coordinator was not authorized by the Court to make such 
decisions. The Parent Coordinator did not just "cross over the line" on accident, it 
appears that he knowingly and willingly tried to defraud Petitioner under the guise of his 
court appointment. 
If the conduct of the Parent Coordinator described above was not already 
unconscionable, he took the outrageous step to engage in adversarial legal argument 
against Petitioner's "ObjectionIAppeal RE: Parenting Coordinator 
Order/Recommendatiou," On December 7, 2005, at a hearing in which the Parenting 
Coordinator was subpeonaed as a witness for Father, the Parenting Coordinator argued 
'O The approximate date on the Parenting Coordinator's billing statement that shows he reviewed the court 
file relating to this case. 
'' Order/Recomendation of Parenting Coordinator dated November 29, 2005 (should be September 29, 
2005). 
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that Father's objections to the Parenting Coordinator's recommendations/orders were not 
timely and were therefore invalid. The Parenting Coordinator's actions at the December 
7, 2005, hearing clearly violate I.R.C.P. 16(1)(7)(B) which states: "[tlhe Parenting 
Coordinator has a primary duty to be impartial." This shows that was not an impartial 
problem solver but a passionate advocate for Mother, emotionally tied to her views and 
desires. 
ISSUE (l)(d): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions that Violated the 
"Parenting Coordinator Oath" 
The Parenting Coordinator violated the "Parenting Coordinator when he 
violated I.R.C.P. 16(1). At the time he violated his oath, the Parenting Coordinator was 
not entitled to renumeration for his services. 
In order to receive renumeration as a Parenting Coordinator, must at a minimum, 
act in conformance with the oath (and I.R.C.P. 16(1)). Once the oath is violated, no 
longer a Parenting Coordinator. Obviously, this issue is intertwined with the previous 
section whereas any violation of I.R.C.P. by the Parenting Coordinator in turns, violates 
the oath he took to become a Parenting Coordinator. 
Once the oath is violatedhreached, the Parenting Coordinator is no longer a 
Parenting Coordinator under the law since compliance with I.R.C.P. 16(1) is a conditional 
requirement set forth by the Supreme Court. A violation of the oath equates to no 
entitlement to payment for the ultra vires services (much like a disbarred attorney suing 
for the collection of fees on a case that in which he committed malpractice). 
All of the "subissues" set forth herein point in the same direction: when a 
Parenting Coordinator performs acts outside the scope of his prescribed boundary, 
'' See the Idaho Supreme Court Application for Registration as a Parenting Coordinator Affidavit of 
Compliance in which each applicant swears under oath: "I have read and understand the contents of 
LR.C.P 16(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procednre, relating to parenting coordinators in child custody and 
visitation disputes, and I will provide this service to which I am appointed in conformance therewith. 
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whether it is a statute, rule, order or oath, the Parenting Coordinator is not entitled to 
payment for the ultra vires services. 
ISSUE (2): A Parenting Coordinator Who Takes Part in Actions that Violate an 
Order, I.R.C.P. 16(1), Idaho Code Section 32-717D and/or the "Parenting 
Coordinator's Oath" is Not Entitled to Payment for His Services 
As analyzed and set forth above, common sense dictates that a person who 
violates a court order, rule andlor oath equates with a violation of public policy. The law 
does not enforce contracts (or portions thereof) that violate public policy or violate the 
law. Idaho Code Section 32-717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1) provide for a court to allocate the 
costs and services of the Parenting Coordinator between the parties, it does not allow a 
court to overlook all other aspects of the law and allow for the collection of services that 
were ultra vires acts. Much as in an agency and/or employment law, the master is not 
liable for acts of the servant that were committed outside the scope of employment. 
Likewise, Father is not liable for the services performed by the Parenting Coordinator 
outside the scope of his authority. 
A review of the transcript of the June 5,2006, hearing (an "Order to Show Cause" 
motion filed by the Parenting Coordinator against Father) illustrates the Parenting 
Coordinator's "testimony" related to the matters discussed in this brief. The Parenting 
Coordinator's memory appears to be very good on facts related to him entitled to 
payment from Father. The Parenting Coordinator's testimony is very poor andlor 
I 
I 
n~nexis ten t~~ on facts related to acting outside the scope of his authority or evidence that 
would help Father in any way. When compared with the statements the Parenting 
73 "I don't recall" 
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Coordinator made to the trial court at the December 7, 2005, hearing, it appears the 
Parenting Coordinator either has a serious mental condition which entirely deletes his 
memory of the recent past or he was purposely misleading the trial court at the June 5, 
2006 hearing. The Parenting Coordinator seems to portray himself as an "expert" of the 
"workings" of 1.R.C.P 16(1) at the December 7,2005, hearing, but exhibited very limited 
knowledge during his testimony at the June 5, 2006 hearing. All in all, the Parenting 
Coordinator appears to be purposefully misleading the trail court at the June 5, 2006, 
hearing in an attempt to preclude evidence that may disprove his claim and assist Father 
in his defense. Based on the Parenting Coordinator's testimony and actions, he should 
have received sanctions from the trial court instead of a judgment. No reasonable "trier 
of fact" would find the Parenting Coordinator credible as a witness. Therefore, any 
weight given to the Parenting Coordinator's testimony and any "evidence" provided by 
the Parenting Coordinator, including the documentary evidence, relied upon by the trial 
court was an abuse of discretion. 
In short, after close examination of the transcript from the hearing, it is very 
evident that the Parenting Coordinator's conduct was bad. Taking into consideration that 
he is a licensed, practicing attorney with 20+ years of experience, his conduct is simply 
outrageous. Taking into consideration that he is also an "extension of the court" by 
reason of his appointment as Parenting Coordinator, his conduct is beyond reproach. 
On April 3, 2007, approximately sixteen (16) months afier the Parenting 
Coordinator's appointment was terminated by the court, the Parenting Coordinator 
appeared on behalf of mother as a witness.74 The hearing was for Mother's "Motion for 
Appointmentof Guardian Ad Liteflarenting Coordinator/Attomey and/or Motion for 
74 Clerk's Record for Case # 34728, Page 67. 
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Order Relative to Extracurricular Activities." Judge Benjamin Simpson, who was 
hearing his first motion after appointed to the case, questioned why the former Parenting 
Coordinator was present.75 This conduct by the Parenting Coordinator further 
demonstrates his demeanor as set forth on prior occasions and explained in this brief - 
revenge and payback against the party appealing his "billings" rather than following the 
tenets set forth by the legislature for Parenting Coordinators: "[ble neutral to the dispute 
and to the parties."76 Note that Idaho Code Section 32-717D does not indicate nor infer 
that the neutrality requirement is dissolved when the Parenting Coordinator's 
appointment is terminated. 
ISSUE (3): At the Hearing on June 5, 2006, the Magistrate Court Committed a 
Reversible Error and/or Abused its Discretion. 
As analyzed above, the failure of the magistrate court to follow LC. Section 32- 
717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1) resulted in a reversible error. The failure to follow the law 
correctly andlor apply the law as Father requested resulting in reversible error. 
The Parenting Coordinator filed an "Order to Show Cause" motion. At the time 
of the hearing, Father timely objected on legal and procedural grounds that said motion 
was deficient.77 The trial court, in essence, ignored the objections and proceeded without 
overruling or sustaining the objections. The trial court "reformed" the Parenting 
Coordinator's "Order to Show Cause" motion and reformed it as a motion to determine 
fees over the objections of Father. The former Parenting Coordinator filed an "Order to 
75 NOTE: The Parenting Coordinator was not supeonaed, he voluntarily showed up, apparently free of 
charge to testify against Father. 
76 Idaho Code Section 32-717D(2)(a). 
77 Page 65, line 4 -Page 69, line 6 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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Show Cause" motion which was legally and procedurally deficient, a motion that appears 
he has no standing to file as a "nonparty" to the case, and the trial court "resurrects" the 
documents as a motion to determine fees. The conduct of the trial court is clearly outside 
of Idaho Law and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and equates to an "abuse of 
discretion" andior reversible error due to the misapplication of the law. 
The trial court also started to the Parenting Coordinator with proving his 
case which Father objected to.79 The trial court asked the witness and moving party (the 
Parenting Coordinator) on the stand: (1) "why you're here," (2) "what your request is," 
and (3) "what information you have to substantiate that request."s0 In Father's view, the 
trial court was providing legal assistance to the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator 
(who is a licensed, practicing attomey) so Father objected. The trial court responded: 
The Court: Do you - - do you have a motion to 
disqualify me? I - - I'm getting real frustrated, Mr. 
Hausladen with this case." 
Father responded by stating that as to the particular issue in front of the court, he 
would feel more comfortable if another magistrate heard the motion8' (since the judge 
78 In Petitioner's opinion it appeared that the trial court was overstepping its bounds and attempting to help 
the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator (who was acting Pro Se and is a practicing attomey - someone 
who should be completely capable of practicing law on his own). 
79 Page 70, line 9 -Page 70, line 5 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenuAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
The trial court later stated: "I'm not - - all's I did is ask him his name and his addre~s."'~ However, the 
transcript does not lie - review the questions by the trial court to the Parenting Coordinator on lines 19 - 11 
on page 70 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. At the time of the hearing and after reviewing the transcript, it appears that the trial 
court was assisting the Parenting Coordinator with proving his case. In addition, towards the end of the 
Parenting Coordinator's testimony, the Court asked another question of the Parenting Coordinator that 
appears only to assist the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator to meet his burden of proof. (See page 
152, lines 16 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenuAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation 
of Appellate Record.). 
Page 71, lines 3 - 5 of Exhibit 1 lo Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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presiding over the hearing also appointed the Parenting Coordinator and refused on at 
least three (3) prior occasions to rule whether the Parenting Coordinator committed ultra 
vires acts). The trial court then denied what seemed to be its own motion for 
disqualification and reasoned: 
The Court: Well, as frustrated as I am with this 
case, I - - I still think that I can uh, be fair and impartial 
in hearing it. I don't think it would be fair to dump this 
case on another judge at this point?3 
From a reasonable, common sense perspective, how can an individual be fair and 
impartial under these circumstances? The trial court was obviously frustrated with what 
appeared to be perfectly legal objections raised by the Father. In addition, from Father's 
perspective, there appears to be a conflict of interest whereas the judge that appointed the 
Parenting Coordinator refused to make a specific factual and legal finding that the 
Parenting Coordinator violated the order of appointment and Idaho Law (committed ultra 
vires acts)84 even though the evidence clearly shows that he did. Although the Parenting 
Coordinator is a practicing attorney, the Court appears to be assisting the Parenting 
Coordinator with proving his case against Father. On its face, as reflected in the 
transcript, the trial court's conduct equates with an "abuse of discretion." 
As clearly set forth in the transcript,8' the trial court refused to make a specific 
factual finding and a specific legal ruling as requested by Father's motion to remove the 
Parenting Coordinator for cause (and denied Father's motion for reconsideration on said 
82 Page 14, lines 14 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
83 Page 73, lines 1 - 4 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
84 See Page 61, lines 1 - 25 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StaternenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
85 See the portion of the transcript relating to the December 7,2005, hearing: Pages 1 - 38 of Exhibit 1 to 
Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.. 
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issue). Although the evidence needed to make the decision was contained in the case file 
(and Father specifically requested the trial court to take judicial notice of said evidence), 
the trial court refused: 
Mr. Hausladen: Uh, I just got a question on that because I - - I 
specifically asked for a legal and factual finding on that uh. I don't 
think the Court acknowledged the fact that came in and uh, argued 
legal argument against my uh - - my motion on the 7'h of December. 
Again, I see this as a uh, issue that's gonna come up later on where 
I'm the bad guy filing motions and I don't have any legal basis for 
what I file, I've just done this to tie up the legal system. That's not the 
case. That's why I'm trying to protect the record and show the actual 
legal analysis and factual finding on what did. It's nothing against 
personally, it has to do with uh - - 
The Court: Well, I'm not willing to make a finding at  this time 
with what I have that exceeded uh, the lawful authority of any orders 
that he had. 
Mr. Hausladen: Not even the fact that he change - - tried to 
change a judgment? 
The Court: No, I'm not - - I'm not - - 
Mr. Hausladen: Okay. 
The Court: - -willing to enter a finding on that. I'm sorry.8" 
Although the Father subpoenaed the Parenting Coordinator to show up for the 
hearing, the Court supplied sufficient "leverage" against Father to dissuade him from 
calling the Parenting Coordinator to the standa7 (See Transcript - see also the audio tape 
of the hearing which iflustrates the "tone" of the Court). Although the trial court 
"dissuaded" the Father from calling the Parenting Coordinator as a witness (and allowing 
Father from presenting portions of the Parenting Coordinator's file for the case into 
evidence), the trial court freely elicited information from the Parenting Coordinator. In 
addition, the trial court reasoned that the testimony of the Parenting Coordinator on the 
*' Page 60 - 61 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Statement/Aftidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
87Althongh it is not shown in the transcript, Judge Watson's mannerisms and tone of voice at the hearing 
send the message: "DO NOT CALL HIM AS A WITNESS OR YOU WILL PAY!" 
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facts wouldlcould be viewed as "biased"*' he should not be called as a witness. The 
elicitation of this information by the trial court somehow did not do this. Most 
importantly, the Parenting Coordinator took part in legal argument against Father's 
objections to the Parenting Coordinator's "~rdersl~ecommendations".~~ Even though 
Father objected to the Parenting Coordinator's conduct, the trial court overruled the 
objection and allowed the Parenting Coordinator to continue with argument that can only 
be viewed as adversarial, not unbiased. 
As stated above, the former Parenting Coordinator had no powers to execute in 
this case. If the Parenting Coordinator violated the terms of an order andor Idaho Law 
andlor the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, he does not come to court with "clean hands" 
9 0 .  . and is not entitled to equitable remedies. Judge Watson's ruling seems to state that it is 
not fair that the Parenting Coordinator performed work and does not get paid. It appears 
that Judge Watson is using an equitable remedy as the basis for the judgment in this case. 
Although the evidence shows many bad acts by the Parenting Coordinator, the Parenting 
Coordinator is purposefully evasive on the stand and appears to be withholding 
information/evidence and much of the time charged by the Parenting Coordinator came 
about because the Parenting Coordinator performed ultra vires acts, the court holds that 
the Parenting Coordinator is entitled for payment for all time that he billed for. In fact, 
Father was even held liable for the time spent by the Parenting Coordinator arguing 
against Father at the December 7, 2005, hearing. In making this holding, Judge Watson 
88 The trial court seemed to say that calling the Parenting Coordinator as a witness to elicit factual 
testimony would somehow effect his indepence or "nbiased" position as a Parent Coordinator. 
89 Page 6 - 7 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of 
Appellate Record. 
Page 157, lines 9 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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seems to stand for the proposition that an individual appointed by the court is immune 
from following Idaho Law and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. No equitable remedy 
backs up this ruling. 
Judge Watson seems to rule that the only important fact is whether the Parenting 
Coordinator undertook "efforts to try to assist the parties in resolving some of their 
disputes."" In addition, Judge Watson stated: "But we're not paying him for being 
successful, we're paying him for his time and his efforts."92 It appears that Judge Watson 
agrees that the order "was lacking" and the order of appointment (or any order) did not 
specify the powers of the Parenting ~oordinator:~ (the Parenting Coordinator had no 
powers to act) the Parenting Coordinator is still entitled to payment. In essence, Judge 
Watson ignored a majority of the evidence, ignored that fact that the Parenting 
Coordinator's testimony was very questionable, ignored the law and essentially ruled that 
the Parenting Coordinator is entitled to payment no matter what. This ruling and 
reasoning is clearly an "abuse of discretion" andor clearly erroneous. 
The magistrate judge's analysis is focused on "reverse engineering" - the 
Parenting Coordinator did not act outside the scope of his authority because the court 
intended for the Parenting Coordinator to have powers to the extent of I.R.C.P.lG(I): 
When uh - - when the Court um, entered an order for a parenting 
coordinator, um, it was my intention that a separate order be entered 
delineating, you know, all of the specific powers and authorities and 
the procedures and all of that required under Idaho Code 32-717 D 
and 17 (L) of the rules. I didn't - - that's not what I got. What 
happened is that that order of appointment was just slipped in as a - - 
91 Page 157, lines 20 - 21 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
92 Page 157, lines 22 -23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
93 Page 157, lines 18-19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for 
Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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it looks like a three-sentence paragraph, paragraph 5, in the order 
modifying custody that Mr. Kochansky prepared and that was - - 
wound up being docketed on February 2. So, you know, part of it is 
my fault in - - in not requiring uh, you know, a separate order. What 
I should have done was crossed out paragraph 5 and required a 
separate order with all those specifics put in that. I didn't do that. I 
just signed the order. Um, and I think as a result of that we - - we've 
run into some difficulties. 
Um, but that - - in my mind that I don't think uh, entitles Mr. uh, 
Hausladen to say, well, I don't owe any fees or cost in this thing. Um, 
when - -when we do look at uh, uh, Idaho Code 32-717 D, it does uh, 
clearly indicate that the Court shall allocate the fees and costs uh, 
between the parties, and the Court may enter an order against either 
or both parties for the reasonable cost, fees, and disbursements of the 
parenting coordinator. 
Um, number 11 of Rule 16(1) deals - - deals with the issue as well. And 
um, I - - I find that uh, even though the specific powers and duties 
were not outlined uh, um, that did undertake uh, efforts to try to 
assist the parties in resolving some of their disputes. It was not 
successful, we're not paying him for being successful. But we're 
paying him for his time and his  effort^?^ 
Obviously the magistrate's analysis is flawed and his refusal to follow the law is a 
reversible error. In fact, the analysis above appears to be substantially similar to a 
different issue in a recently decided family law case, Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 
In this case the father's equal rights were prejudiced by the mother 
absconding with the child in violation of I.C. 8 18-4506 and obtaining 
an unfounded domestic violence order in Montana restricting the 
father's ability to maintain a relationship with his child. Glossing over 
these facts and going to the end result that the mother has a greater 
relationship with the child than the father creates an untenable 
condition. If permitted to stand, the lesson from this case is that the 
law may be disregarded, a crime committed, falsehoods told, and 
advantage gained from the misconduct. The proceedings should not 
have been allowed to continue for the duration with the mother 
holding the child out of state while gaining all of the evidentiary 
benefits of an enhanced relationship with that child to the detriment 
of the father. 
94 Page 156, lines 17 - 25 and page 157, lines 1 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in 
Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record. 
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As in the Hopper case above, it appears the magistrate court believed that 
payment of the Parenting Coordinator outweighed the need to follow the law. If 
permitted to stand, a lesson from this case is that the Parenting Coordinator can do 
anything he or she wishes (and get full payment for any and all "services") whether it 
violates the order of appointment, LC. Section 32-717D andor I.R.C.P. 16(1). 
CONCLUSION -RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court's decision to issue a judgment in favor of the former court- 
appointed Parenting Coordinator was in contradiction of Idaho law, the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and was clearly erroneous. Father requests that the magistrate court's 
ruling be reversed and the judgment against Father relating to the June 5, 2006 Order to 
Show Cause HearingIMotion to Determine Fees hearing be vacated. The former 
Parenting Coordinator took part in ultra vires acts that violated the trial court's order of 
appointment, Idaho Code Section 32-7171) and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1). The Parenting 
Coordinator must refund any moneys paid by Father since the Parenting Coordinator 
could not exercise any powers (and therefore could not bill for any "services" provided). 
The orderljudgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator against Father be 
stricken/deleted!voided. 
In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the magistrate court 
decisionljudgment be vacated and the proceedings be remanded and reheardltried. 
Father requests any and all costs allowed a pro se litigant under Idaho law 
pursuant to I.A.R. 40 on this appeal. 
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